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: IN THE SUPREME COURT
I OF THE STATE OF UTAH
BEULAH B. GOCKE,

Appellant,

vs.
OTTO A. 'VIESLEY, DANIEL A.
EL T 0 N, ELIOT Y. GATES,
:MEMBERS OF BOARD OF REYIE'V OF THE INDUSTRIAL
COMMISSION OF UTAH, DEPARTMENT OF EMPLOYMENT SECURITY,
Respondents.

Case No.
10514

RESPONDENTS' BRIEF

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
On September 29, 1965, a representative of the
Utah Department of Employment Security of the Industrial Commission of Utah issued a review decision
affirming a prior decision issued September 14, 1965,
denying unemployment benefits to the appellant for the
ten-week period commencing September 5, 1965, and
ending November 8, 1965, on the grounds that she did
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not meet the eligibility requirement of the Utah Employment Security Act that a claimant be available for
work.
After due notice and hearing the Appeals Referee
of the Department of Employment Security on November 8, 1965, affirmed the ineligibility of the claimant
for unemployment benefits to the date of hearing,
November 4, 1965. On December 1, 1965, the Board
of Review of the Industrial Commission of Utah affirmed the decision of the Appeals Referee and denied
any further hearing on appeal. The matter is now
before this Court on a petition for review of the decision
of the Board of Review, which was filed on the 20th
day of December, 1965.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The appellant's statement of facts is correct except
m two respects:
1. The record does not show as stated on page one

of appellant's brief that the appellant was told
that her former employer wished to rehire her
as soon as she was able to return to work. Rather
the prospect of return to such employer was
indefinite (R-16, 18, 19).

2. The record does not show that the appellant
contacted her former employer as the appellant's
brief (at page three) indicates between September 14, 1965, and November 4, 1965, but
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only that she did so within the last two weeks in
September ( R-22) .

THE ISSUE
The issue involved in this case is whether the appellant must be allowed unemployment benefits as a matter
of right on the grounds that there was no evidence whatsoever to support the respondents' finding that her
personal efforts to seek work were insufficient in light
of her individual circumstances to indicate a definite
affirmative attachment to the labor market or availability for work.

ARGUMENT
POINT ONE
THE UTAH EMPLOYMENT SECURITY
ACT BARS THE DEPART~IENT OF EMPLOYMENT SECURITY FROM PAYING
UNEMPLOYMENT BENEFITS
EXCEPT
WHERE THE CLAI~IANT IS BOTH REGISTERED FOR WORK AND AVAILABLE FOR
WORK.
That portion of the Employment Security Act
which is central to this case is 35-4-4, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, which imposes a limitation
upon eligibility for unemployment benefits as follows:
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"35-4-4 An unemployed individual shall be
eligible to receive benefits with respect to any
week only if it has been found by the commission
that:
" (a) He has made a claim for benefits with
respect to such week in accordance with such
regulations as the commission may prescribe.
"(b) He has registered for work at, and thereafter continued to report at, an employment office, ...
" ( c) He is able to work and is available for
work."
The plain meaning of the quoted language is to
require a disallowance of unemployment benefits unless
the commission finds that the claimant has fulfilled
several conjunctive requirements, these pertaining to
(a) filing claims, and (b) registering for work and continuing thereafter to report at the employment off ice,
and ( c) being for the period in question able to work
and available for work. That the requirement of availability for work is a separate one to be met on a weekby-week basis, over and above the claimant's mere registration and reporting, appears clear from the structure
of the Act and such has been affirmed by cases in other
jurisdictions. Chadwick v. E,mployment Security Board
of Review, 192 Kan. 769, 390 P. 2d 1017; Shannon v.
Bureau of Unemployment Compensation, 155 Ohio St.
53, 97 NE 2d 425; Department of Industrial Relations
v. Tomlinson (Alabama) , 36 So. 2d 496.
It is apparent that the commission may and must
require affirmative indications that the several funda-
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mental requirements are met as a basis for its findings
to that effect. In accord is the leading Michigan case
of Dwyer v. Appeal Board of Michigan, U. C. Comm.,
321 :Mich. 178, 32 NW 2d 434. By the same token, the
commission would act inconsistently with the law if it
declared such requirements to have been met and allowed benefits when it had evidence before it indicating
the contrary to be true. This is particularly true when
there has been a voluntary withdrawal from the labor
market and an absence therefrom for several months.
POINT TWO
IN APPL YING THE "AVAILABLE FOR
'VORK" REQUIREMENTS OF THE EMPLOYMENT SECURITY ACT, THE DEPARTMENT OF EMPLOYMENT SECURITY
MAY LOOK BEYOND A CLAIMANT'S MERE
DECLARED SUBJECTIVE WILLINGNESS
TO ACCEPT 'VORK FOR OBJECTIVE EVIDENCES OF AVAILABILITY SUCH AS PERSON AL EFFORTS TO SEEK WORK.
In the appellant's brief the foregoing point is conceded. However, since this case is one of the first impression in certain aspects the related authorities should
be cited. They are clearly to the effect that "availability
for work" as used in Employment Security Acts implies an obligation upon the claimant to make personal
efforts to find work. In Dwyer v. Appeal Board of
Michigan U. C. Commission, supra, the Michigan Court
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analyzed an act identical in its material respects to that
in Utah and concluded that registration and availability
for work are separate requirements, and that from the
availability requirement it is reasonable to infer the
need for a personal search for work as an affirmatin
indication of labor market attachment. The Court specifically found the Unemployment Compensation Commission to be right in its position that it could not find
the availability requirement met without an objective
manifestation of attachment to the labor market by
the claimant's efforts to seek work.
Among numerous other authorities in accord are
Teague v. Florida Industrial Commission (Florida),
104 So. 2d 612; Shannon v. Bureau of Unemployment
Compensation, supra; Department of Industrial Relation v. Tomlinson, supra; Farrer v. Director of Divit)ion of Employment Security, 324 l\'Iass. 45, 84 NE 2d
540; Mohler v. Department of Labor, 409 Ill. 79, 97
NE 2d 762, and cases cited therein.
The duty to determine the facts has been delegated
to the commission by law and a realistic interpretation
of the facts and circumstances is essential to the successful operation of the program.
In its search for truth, the commission has the right
and duty to consider the interest of the appellant; the
probability or improbability of her assertions in light
of the proved or admitted facts; the general situation
as shown by all of the surrounding circumstances ; the
conditions or compulsions under which the appellant
6

acted and under which she testifies; her prejudices, if
any, and her desires; together with many other factors
including restrictions as to wages, hours, and kinds of
work which the appellant will accept. (Indiana) Haynes
v. Brown (1949) 88 NE 2d 795; Walton v. JVilhelrn,
91 NE 2d 373 .
Basically the commission operates on the premise
that the philosophy underlying the "availability" requirement is that benefits under the unemployment
compensation system should be resened for those unemployed workers, otherwise eligible, who maintain a
genuine attachment to the labor market.
Obviously any general premise must be implemented. Each claimant must be tested or examined on
a week-by-week basis to determine whether he or she
has done those things which might be reasonably expected of one diligently seeking work, keeping in mind
his skill, his training, and the labor market.
We agree with the Nelson v. Van Horn Construction Cornpany case cited by appellant at page 8, that
a union man who pays his dues and keeps in contact
with his union is diligently seeking work when in his
labor market the majority of all construction workers
are hired by employers through the union hiring hall.
An employer might be expected to rehire an employee through a telephone contact. '"'e cannot agree
that telephone calls asking whether openings exist are
a reflection of a genuine labor market attachment, par-
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ticularly when they are few in number and over a tenweek period. At best they constitute a desultory effort.
POINT THREE
A PROPER AD.MINISTRATIVE TEST TO
BE APPLIED IN '"7"EIGHING THE SUFFICIENCY OF A CLAIMANT'S PERSONAL
EFFORTS TO SEEK 'VORK AS AN OBJECTIVE INDICATOR OF AVAILABILITY FOR
WORK IS WHETHER THE CLAIMANT
ACTED IN A REASONABLE .MANNER UNDER HIS INDIVIDUAL CIRCUMSTANCES
TO RELIEVE HIS UNEMPLOYMENT.
Among the authorities cited under Point Two
above are numerous statements evaluating the respective claimant's efforts to seek work against the standard
of a reasonable search in terms of the claimant's facts
and circumstances. 'Vith considerable uniformity the
cases on availability observe that the determination
is an individual one to be made by the application of
basic guides (the reasonable search or reasonable conduct test) to the claimant's peculiar facts and circumstances. In cases where the test used is not "reasonable
efforts" it is often "active efforts." An example of the
latter construction under a statute materially identical
to Utah's is Florida Industrial Commi.ssion v. Ciarlante
(Florida), 84 So. 2d I. In the course of an extensive
review of sustaining authorities, the case being one of
the first impression there, the Florida Court noted:
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"It has also been argued here that the policy
adopted by the Florida Industrial Commission
of requiring claimants to indicate their desire to
become employed and their 'availability for
work' by actively seeking work has the effect of
adding, adminstratively, an additional requirement for eligibility . . . This contention cannot
be sustained. The Act not only requires registration for employment but also, that the claimant
be found to be able to work and available for
work. It does not seem to be an unreasonable
interpretation of the general terms of the statute
that 'availability' should be evidenced by something more than mere registration with an employment agency and expressed willingness to
work."

POINT FOUR
THERE WAS SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE
IN THE RECORD TO INDICATE THAT CONSIDERING HER INDIVIDUAL FACTS AND
CIRCUMSTANCES THE APPELLANT DID
NOT ACT REASONABLY TO RELIEVE HER
UNEMPLOYMENT AND WAS NOT AV AILABLE FOR WORK.
The appellant's case on appeal relies heavily upon
the assertion that she had a definite prospect of early
re-employment with her former employer and that she
looked, therefore, initially to this source rather than
to extensive outside contacts. However, if the record
be examined closely it may be seen that the claimant
did not in fact have any definite prospect with her
9

former and that she knew or might have known this
both by the facts as to her relationship with the employer before and after her separation and by the facts
as to the limitations upon her own hours of work as
contrasted to the employer's required or desired hours
for her services.
Although the appellant's brief states broadly that
she left employment with the understanding that the
employer "wished to rehire her as soon as she was able
to return to work" (p. 1), the record is devoid of substantiation of this assertion. Rather, the appellant gives
indication by her own testimony that: ( 1) the employer
declined to place her on pregnancy leave, in effect
denying her the right of rehire after the birth of her
child (R-16), (2) that the company treatment on the
occasion of her termination bothered her with the notion
that something was wrong which she might have been
in a position to correct ( R-16) , ( 3) that as of September 13, 1965, her former employer had no openings
and was not hiring (R-15, 16), (4) that from September 13, 1965, to the first week in October she was
definitely limited to working day shift only ( R-15,
17), and ( 5) that thereafter her willingness to work
other than day shifts was extremely doubtful. As to
this latter point, the appellant reported at various times
during the hearing: "If I had to I could work swing
shift. It would not be convenient, but if I had to I
could," ( R-15), "I did work night shift (previously)
because my children were old enough to ... " (R-16),
"I wanted to worl.; days last year and I couldn't trans-
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fer" (R-16), "I finally decided that maybe if I could
possibly get on at nights out there, because they have
more turnover on the night shift, that I could try it
for awhile. It wouldn't be the most satisfactory arrangement'' ( R-17), "I don't think I could work very long
on the night shift, as far as that goes. They would have
to transfer me." (R-17). (Emphasis supplied.)
Considering these several indications of the appellant's actual unwillingness to work night shift, her
extra problems of leaving a new baby at night and her
inability to get back to work on day shift as emphasized
by her former inability, even while actively employed,
to transfer to day shift, it is not unreasonable to conclude that the appellant had no good prospect of reemployment at her former place of work. .More important as pertaining to her subjective frame of mind, it
is also reasonable to conclude from the foregoing that
the appellant must have realized the great likelihood
that she would not find work with her former employer
at all, let alone on a basis compatible with her limited
freedom as to hours. As a further indication of this
latter likelihood, the appellant's counsel by leading
questions implied a possibility that the appellant had
personal difficulties at her former employment. The
questions and answers thereto, taken with the earlier
reference at R-16, fairly sustain at least an inference
that the appellant did have a feeling of some personal
attitude or prejudice against her at the former employment (R-21, 22).
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The record also contains evidence sustaining inferences that the appellant's search for work independent
of the former employer was not a reasonable one, under
her circumstances. The appellant reported no personal
contacts to locate prospective new employment for more
than two months following the birth of her baby on
July 24, 1965 ( R-17), although she was released by
the doctor midway in that period (September 4, 1965)
(R-17). According to the testimony, her first personal
application was to Albertson's on October 15, 1965
(R-20), nearly three months after the birth of her
child, six weeks after her release by the doctor, and four
weeks after she was advised of the denial of benefits
because of her failure to show by her efforts a genuine
availability for work (R-46). This fact negatives to a
great extent the assertions elsewhere in the record that
the appellant was acting reasonably to minimize the
length of her unemployment and obtain an early return
to work.
When asked by the Referee (R-19) what she was
doing to occupy her time primarily, the appellant replied: "Truthfully, getting everything caught up that
I could possibly get caught up in the house so that I
would be ready to go at a minute's notice for work, I
mean. Doing extra cleaning and doing extra sewing,
trying to get my children's wardrobes complete for
the year until next summer. This is just practical thinking, I feel." This is not indicative of a genuine attachment to the labor market. Rather it reflects a lack of
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urgency to seek work even though at that time her
husband was apparently also unemployed.
The appellant reported on September 13, 1965,
that the " ... kinds of work" she was " ... ready, willing, and able to accept" were "Electronics assembly
work" and that the minimum wage which would be
acceptable to her was $1.85 per hour, based on the scale
in that occupation (R-15, 27). Despite this fact, she
made only one personal application to an employer in
that field during the entire fifteen weeks from the date
of birth of her child to the date of hearing (R-20).
Although she made a few telephone calls to other places,
it was not capricious or arbitrary for the Referee and
the Board to view these as an insufficient substitute for
actual visits to places of prospective employment in her
field when they were attempting to determine whether
the appellant acted like a person who really wanted
to find early employment. It is submitted that the
minimal effort of a personal application rather than
a mere telephone call is not an unreasonable one to
expect of the sincere job seeker who is anxious to end
his unemployment.
Further, the appellant reported applications to
two grocery markets and telephone calls to a jewelry
company, a bag company, and food company as indica··
tive of her active efforts to seek work ( R-20). Although
the record does not attempt either to substantiate or
impeach her sincerity as to these places, such sincerity
does appear questionable on the face of the record since
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none offers work in the technical occupation which she
reported as her basis of availability. The record does
not develop t!1e facts as to any potential salary disparity
between the appellant's expressed minimum acceptable
wage of $1.85 per hour and the going rate for the other
divergent occupations about which she says she inquired,
but such disparity might well exist. Now here in the
record does the appellant express herself as being
willing to change occupations or accept a lower wage.
Counsel for appellant reports his failure to find
any case in which efforts comparable to the appellant's
have been determined to be insufficient as an indication
of availability for work. '7\Thile it is true that the cases
turn very much upon individual facts and circumstances
and the inferences therein, the authorities are not without examples parallel to the appellant's facts. In the
case of Ethel R. Chadwick v. Employment Security
Board of Review, supra, the Kansas Supreme Court
in 1964 reversed the District Court and upheld the
Board's decision denying benefits on the insufficiency
of the claimant's efforts to seek work, concluding that
there was relevant evidence in the record from which
the Board might determine as it did that the efforts
were not a reasonable search for work for one in the
claimant's circumstances. The claimant in that case
was a telephone operator who worked until October
15, 1961, at which time she entered on pregnancy leave.
Following the birth of her child on December 11, 1961,
she was released to work by her doctor on January 21,
1962. She initiated a claim for unemployment benefits
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on January 14, 1962. She attempted unsuccessfully to
obtain reinstatement with her former employer and to
transfer from Olathe, Kansas, to Parsons, Kansas,
where her husband had moved and was working. On
March 22, 1962, the claimant moved to Parsons. This
' claimant's efforts to seek work in the period of January
21, 1962, to April 25, 1962, were found by the Referee
to have included personal applications to the county
courthouse, the Olathe News, "various PBX users"
(number unspecified), and two Federal agencies. The
latter two employers required a test which the claimant
had not taken as of the date of the hearing.

1

The Court found the claimant to have made three
personal applications between January 21, 1962, and
March 12, 1962, and three more personal applications
between March 13, 1962, and April 25, 1962. The
claimant also registered for work and reported weekly
at the State Employment Office. The claimant in this
case reported that she would accept a minimum wage of
$75.00 per week and that she would work day hours.
In her former job she had been paid $78.50 per week
and she appears to have worked at least some night
hours.
In concluding that the claimant's actions did not
constitute a reasonable effort to seek work within the
meaning of the availability statute, the Kansas Court
cited its own earlier case of Clark v. Board of Review,
187 Kan. 695, 359 P. 2d 856, in which the Court reviewed numerous authorities as to the meaning of "rea-
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sonable efforts to find work" and noted, " . . . one of
the tests is whether the facts show that a claimant
sincerely wants work and has acted in a reasonable
manner under his circumstances in trying to relieve
his unemployment." (At 359 P. 2d 858.)

POINT FIVE
THAT IN REVIE\VING DETERMINATIONS OF THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION
UNDER THE UTAH EMPLOYlVIENT SECURITY ACT THE COURT \VILL AFFIRl\I
THE COl\IMISSION FINDINGS IF SUCH
ARE SUSTAINED BY EVIDENCE IN THE
RECORD.
Although the point is not disputed, it might be
noted herein that consistently with the general rule as
to scope of review in administrative cases this Court
will affirm an administrative denial of benefits unless
such denial was clearly capricious, arbitrary, and unreasonable. Kennecott Copper Corporation Employees
v. Department of Ernployment Security, 13 Utah 2d
262, 372 P. 2d 987. In Members of Iron Workers Union
of Provo v. Industrial Commission, 104 Utah 242, 2418;
139 P. 2d 208, 211, this Court said:

"If there is substantial competent evidence to
sustain the findings and decision of the Industrial Commission, this court may not set aside the
decision even though on a review of the record
we might well ha \'e reached a different result."
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POINT SIX
THAT THE ElVIPLOYMENT SECURITY
ACT IS TO BE LIBERALLY CONSTRUED
TO ACCOMPLISH ITS OBJECTS BUT SUCH
RULE DOES NOT PERMIT AN EXTENSION
OF UNEMPLOYMENT BENEFITS TO ONE
'!\THOSE INITIAL OR CONTINUED UNE.MPLOYMENT ~IAY BE VOLITIONAL.
It is a generally acknowledged rule that Employment Security Acts are construed liberally to accomplish their purposes and objectives. However, in Utah
and elsewhere the courts construe the Acts in a manner
which distinguishes those petitioning as beneficiaries
of the Act who become unemployed for reasons attributable to themselves or whose failure to become re-employed may be attributable to their own actions or
failure to act. In Kennecott Copper Corporation Employees v. Department of Employment Security, supra,
this Court was careful to point out that the purpose
of the Employment Security Act is to assist the worker
and his family in times when, without fault on his part,
he is out of work. In Olaf Nelson Construction Company v. Industrial Commission, 121 Utah 521, 243 P.
2d 951, the Court noted that the underlying legislative
intent is that the commission is to determine a claimant's
eligibility for unemployment benefits by adhering to
the volitional test, and declared the policy of the contributions provisions of the statute to be to establish
financial reserves for the benefit of persons unemployed
through no fault of their own.
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Representative of the position of other courts is
the statement of the Kansas Court in Clark v. Board
of Review, supra. In denying unemployment benefits
on the grounds that the claimant had not made a reasonable search for work, the Court noted as a factor
in construction of the Act that " ... benefits are for
those who are unemployed through no fault of their
own and are willing, anxious, and ready to support
themselves and family, and who are unemployed because
of conditions over which they have no control." In a
similar context the Alabama Supreme Court upheld
the denial of unemployment benefits to a worker who
had failed to show availability by reasonable efforts
to seek work. In so doing the Court declared the unemployment compensation law to be remedial and hence
susceptible of liberal construction to realize its purpose.
However, the Court noted that the Act was designed
to ameliorate consequences of the failure of industry
to provide jobs, i.e., to insure a diligent worker against
the vicissitudes of enforced unemployment. Department of Industrial Relations v. Tomlinson, supra.

CONCLUSION
The law imposes upon the commission a duty of
distinguishing the eligible claimant who is "available
for work" from one who does not meet this requirement.
As an objective manifestation of a claimant's subjective condition of availability, the commission reasonably
looks to the nature and extent of the claimant's efforts
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to seek work and considers these in light of the claimant's individual circumstances. Where there is substantial evidence that a claimant's efforts to seek work are
not reasonable under the circumstances, the commission
may find the availability requirement not met and deny
benefits. Such was the case with the appellant. There
was evidence upon ther record which formed a basis for
the commission's denial of benefits. Since there was sustaining evidence, the denial of benefits in this case was
consistent with principles of construction applicable to
the Employment Security Act and should be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,
PHIL L. HANSEN
Attorney General
Attorney for Respondents
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